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Micro aerial vehicles a.k.a. drones, have become an integral part of a variety of civilian and 
military application domains, including but not limited to aerial surveying and mapping, aerial 
surveillance and security, aerial inspection of infrastructure, and aerial delivery. Meanwhile, the 
cybersecurity of drones is gaining significant attention due to both financial and strategic 
information and value involved in aerial applications. As a result of the lack of security features 
in the communication protocol, an adversary can easily interfere with on-going communications 
or even seize control of the drone. In this thesis, we propose a lightweight digital signature 
protocol, also referred to as DroneSig, to protect drones from a man-in-the-middle attack, where 
an adversary eavesdrops the communication between Ground Control Station (GCS) and drone, 
and impersonates the GCS and sends fake commands to terminate the on-going mission or even 
take control over the drone. The basic idea of the DroneSig is that the drone will only execute the 
new command after validating the received digital signature from the GCS, proving that the new 
command message is coming from the authenticated GCS. If the validation of the digital 
signature fails, the new command is rejected immediately, and the Return-to-Launch (RTL) 
mode is initiated and forces the drone to return to the take-off position. We conduct extensive 
simulation experiments for performance evaluation and comparison using OMNeT++, and 
simulation results show that the proposed lightweight digital signature protocol achieves better 
performance in terms of energy consumption and computation time compared to the standard 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic technique. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Micro aerial vehicles, a.k.a. drones, are flying robots endowed with the capabilities of 
sensing, computing, and wireless communicating, and becoming progressively popular in 
various civilian and military application areas, including but not limited to aerial surveying and 
mapping, aerial surveillance and security, aerial inspection of infrastructure, and aerial delivery 
(Pu & Carpenter, 2019). The global small drones market is projected to reach USD 40.31 billion 
by 2025, at a compound annual growth rate of 17.04% from 2018 to 2025 (“Global Small Drones 
Market,” 2018). By 2026, commercial drones for both corporate and consumer applications will 
have an annual impact of $31 billion to $46 billion on the United States GDP (“Commercial 
drones are here,” n.d.). As the drone-based civilian and military applications are proliferating, 
Internet of Drones (IoD), a layered aerial network management and control architecture, was 
proposed and has been demonstrated as an applicable architecture for coordinating the access of 
drones to controlled airspace and providing navigation services (Pu & Carpenter, 2020). With the 
assistance of advanced communication technology as well as emerging computing infrastructure, 
we envision that drones will definitely find many new ways to improve the quality of our life in 
the near future (Pu, 2019).  
Due to both financial and strategic information and value involved in aerial applications, 
however, drones look especially attractive to attackers and become an ideal target for various 
cyber-attacks (Lin et al., 2018). For example, in January 2016, Mexican drug traffickers used 
satellite navigation signal deception technology to send spoofed GPS signals to attack the U.S. 
border patrol drone in order to illegally cross the border. In December 2011, Iran successfully 
captured a U.S. Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel drone through spoofing the drone’s GPS 
system. Nowadays, drones have started showing their impact in everyday life of ordinary people 
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and have been considered as a supplement of humans in a part of the delivery in the business. 
Business and technology giants like Amazon, Google, Facebook, and Walmart have started 
delivering the products and services via drones for the speedy delivery and customer satisfaction. 
However, aerial drone applications are vulnerable to a myriad of cyber-attacks targeting their 
communication links with Ground Control Station (GCS), as well as with other air units (Sanjab 
et al., 2017). Therefore, investigating potential cybersecurity threats against drones and 
designing state-of-the-art security mechanisms are the top priority to improve the security of 
drone applications.  
Unfortunately, the open nature of the wireless channel and the limited battery capacity, 
computing capability, and communication bandwidth make it become a highly challenging task 
(Pu, 2018). Communication between drones and GCS is established by the communication 
protocol via a wireless channel, which makes them vulnerable to various attacks since the 
communication protocol does not support security procedures (Koubaa et al., 2019). The GCS 
and drones exchange data through an unauthenticated wireless channel without encryption. Thus, 
data communication can be easily hacked. For example, an adversary can send unauthorized 
commands to the drone to take its control from GCS, and then catch and withhold the drone. 
This example is exactly showing that how the “anti-drone-gun” operates (Dronebuster™, 2018), 
or hijacking the drone to have it go to an arbitrary waypoint (Feng et al., 2019). Therefore, it is 
critical to ensure the security of communication in drone applications.  
In this thesis, we propose a lightweight digital signature protocol, also named as 
DroneSig, to protect drones from man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, where an adversary 
eavesdrops the communication between GCS and drone, and impersonates the GCS and sends 
fake commands to terminate the on-going mission or even take control over the drone. In the 
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DroneSig, the GCS generates a digital signature based on the command message by using the 
chaotic system and appends the digital signature to the command message. Before executing the 
received command, the drone validates the digital signature by comparing it to its own generated 
digital signature from the received command message. If the validation of the digital signature 
fails, the command is rejected immediately, and the Return-to-Launch (RTL) mode is initiated 
and forces the drone to return to take-off position. We develop a customized simulation 
framework and evaluate its performance through extensive simulations in terms of energy 
consumption, computation time, CPU cycle, memory usage, and code size. We also revisit prior 
AES, DES, and 3DES (Stallings, 2006), and modify them to work in the framework for 
performance comparison. The simulation results show that the proposed DroneSIG can achieve 
better performance in terms of energy consumption, computation time, CPU cycle, memory 
usage, and code size compared to AES, DES, and 3DES.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Prior schemes are provided and analyzed in 
Section II. A system model and the proposed DroneSig are presented in Section III. Section IV 
focuses on simulation results and their analyses. Section V discusses the future work, Compare 
the security of the protocol. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A significant volume of research work has mainly focused on developing security 
mechanisms and features to ensure the necessary security services of drones, such as 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, and protect drones from various cyber-attacks. 
Srinivas, Das, Kumar, and Rodrigues (2019) described a temporal credential-based anonymous 
lightweight user authentication mechanism is proposed to address the authentication problem in 
the IoD environment based on a three-factor scheme using user’s mobile device, password, and 
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biometrics. Ozmen and Yavuz (2018) proposed an optimized public key infrastructure based 
framework integrated with lightweight symmetric primitives is proposed for small aerial drones, 
where special precomputation methods and optimized elliptic curves are harnessed to reduce the 
computational overhead and energy consumption. An encryption mechanism that improves the 
communication security of open source drones is proposed based on Galois Embedded Crypto 
(GEC) and ArduinoLibs Crypto library to provide safer and more secure communication service 
for radio control link (Podhradsky et al., 2017). A medium-interaction portable drone honeypot, 
also called HoneyDrone, is designed for protecting drones by Daubert, Boopalan, Mühlhäuser, 
and Vasilomanolakis (2018). The basic idea of HoneyDrone is to emulate a number of drone-
specific and drone-tailored protocols, lure adversary into attacking drone honeypot, and record 
and analyze malicious activities to detect potential attackers. 
According to Won, Seo and Bertino (2020), a lookup table shuffling mechanism that 
supports white-box block cipher with dynamics is proposed to protect unmanned vehicles from 
white-box attacks, where attackers with sufficient knowledge of a target unmanned vehicle can 
steal secret information stored in the unmanned vehicle through taking advantage of advanced 
reverse engineering techniques and exploiting the vulnerabilities of open-source software. Since 
no short secret key is used by an unmanned vehicle during the protocol, the shuffling mechanism 
can be safely executed in the white-box environment and make it hard for a white-box attacker to 
successfully encrypt/decrypt any plaintext/ciphertext even if the attacker has the knowledge of 
the entire lookup table. A new system model is proposed to secure drone communication for the 
data collection and transmission in the IoD environment, where public blockchain technology is 
used for the storage of collected data from the drones and update the information into the 
distributed ledgers to reduce the burden of drones (Aggarwal et al., 2019). According to 
5 
experimental evaluation, the proposed system model makes the realtime drone-based 
applications more reliable and scalable and can defend against various risks and attacks. 
He, Qiao, Chan, and Guizani (2018) proposed that use information fusion by combining a 
visual sensor and inertial measurement unit to detect GPS spoofing attacks in an airborne fog 
computing system. In order to address the challenging information leakage problem of 
eavesdropping attack, leverages the physical characteristics of wireless channels to achieve the 
goal of secure transmissions in unmanned aerial vehicles communication networks (Li et al., 
2019). In addition, an overview of security threats and attacks against communication protocol 
for unmanned systems and potential security solutions are also presented by Koubaa et al. 
(2019). Liang, Zhao, Shetty, and Li (2017) proposed a blockchain and cloud storage-based 
framework to guarantee the UAV data integrity. The hashed data records collected from drones 
are stored in the blockchain network, and a blockchain receipt for each data record is also stored 
in the cloud, which can reduce the burden of moving drones with the limit of battery and process 
capability while gaining enhanced security guarantee of the data. The article presents the 
ideology of the secure utilization of drones for inter-service operability in ultra-dense wireless 
networks by exploiting the features of the blockchain (Sharma et al., 2017). Zhang, He, Li, and 
Chen (2020) proposed a lightweight authentication and key agreement scheme in which there are 
only secure one-way hash function and bitwise XOR operations when drones and users mutually 
authenticate each other. The proposed scheme is comprised of three phases: the setup phase, the 
registration phase, and the mutual authentication phase. In the setup phase, the control station 
generates its master private key and other public system parameters. In the registration phase, 
users and drones register on the control station and get their secret key via a secure channel. In 
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the last phase, users and drones communicate with each other securely after establishing a 
session key. 
In summary, various cryptographic techniques have been well studied to protect drones 
from cyber-attacks. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive and 
lightweight defense mechanism against MITM attack for drones. 
III. THE PROPOSED LIGHTWEIGHT DIGITAL SIGNATURE PROTOCOL 
In this section, we first introduce the system model and chaotic system, then propose a 
lightweight digital signature protocol, also named as DroneSig, to protect drones from man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attack. 
A. SYSTEM MODEL  
 
Figure 1. System model. 
 
This image shows a basic system diagram where there is a Radio Control (RC) link to be 
used by the GCS to manually control the drone. However, the communication link between GCS 
and drone is established via a wireless channel, which is vulnerable to various security attacks 
due to its openness. To be specific, the GCS exchanges data with the drone through an 
unauthenticated and unencrypted channel; as a result, the communications can be easily hacked 







eavesdrop the communication between GCS and drone and impersonates the GCS and sends 
fake commands to terminate the on-going mission or even gain direct control over the drone 
(Srinivas et al., 2019). Here, a successful communication link attack without involving “anti-
drone-gun” has already been demonstrated on a popular DSMx radio protocol to hijack the drone 
(Liang et al., 2017). 
B. CHAOTIC SYSTEM  
A chaotic system is a dynamical and determined system with the extrinsic nature of 
nonlinear behavior, pseudo-randomness, broad-spectrum, and sensitivity to initial conditions. In 
the past few decades, a state of disorder and nonlinear dynamics have been used in the design of 
cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generators. These pseudo-random number 
generators use the control parameters and the initial condition of the chaotic maps as their keys. 
Without the right initial conditions, the correct pseudo-random sequence cannot be regenerated. 
Duffing map is a two-dimensional discrete-time and dynamical system that exhibits chaotic 
behavior. It is widely known to display chaos for certain parameter values and initial conditions. 
Duffing map contains a single cubic term and is expressed below, 
{
𝑥𝑛+1  =  𝑦𝑛
𝑦𝑛+1  =  −𝑏 ∙  𝑥𝑛  +  𝑎 ∙  𝑦𝑛  −  𝑦𝑛
3 
Table 1. Duffing Map 
 
where a and b are constant parameters. The output of the Duffing map highly depends on 
the initial conditions represented by x0 and y0. The constant parameters are usually sent to a = 
2.75 and b = 0.2 to produce chaotic behavior. Disregarding the initial point (0.5, 0.5), the Duffing 
map outputs points around the Duffing map attractor in a random way.  
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(a) x0 = 0.4 and y0 = 0.6 
 
(b) x0 = 0.6 and y0 = 0.4 
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(c) x0 = 0.55 and y0 = 0.45 
 
(d) x0 = 0.45 and y0 = 0.55 
Figure 2. Duffing map with different initial conditions after 50 iterations. 
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As shown in Figure 2, any change in the initial conditions will affect the plot of these 
points. 
C. LIGHTWEIGHT DIGITAL SIGNATURE PROTOCOL  
The DroneSig adopts a technique that is similar to cryptographic encryption but requires 
less computational resources. In addition, the DroneSig is designed to encode and decode binary 
information without using standard cryptographic techniques, such as DES or AES. In DroneSig, 
the digital signature is generated by using a random number generator, Duffing map, which can 
assist both GCS and drone to achieve the same key without the necessity to wirelessly share it on 
a public wireless medium.  
The DroneSig consists of three functions: byte substitution, matrix transformation, and 
random shuffling.  
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Figure 3. The overall structure of the DroneSig. 
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Figure 3 shows the overall structure of the DroneSig. Each message command has 256 
bytes and is divided into a set of 16-byte blocks. Byte substitution and matrix transformation will 
be applied to each block, whilst random shuffling will be performed on all blocks. First, each 









1    0    0    0    1    1    1    1
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0 ) is the value of multiplicative inverse in GF (2
8) for input byte 
(b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0). As an example, considering the input byte {95}. the multiplicative inverse in 









1    0    0    0    1    1    1    1
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Table 3. Byte Substitution (2) 
 
According to Table 3, the result byte is {2A}. The process of byte substitution is done. 
Second, the 16 substituted bytes in a block are depicted as a 4 × 4 square matrix, and each 
byte of a column in square matrix is mapped into a new value that is a function of all four bytes 
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in that column. The transformation is defined by matrix transformation in Figure 3. Each element 
in the product matrix is the sum of products of elements of one row and one column. In this case, 
the individual additions and multiplications are performed in GF (28). The matrix transformation 
on a single column can be expressed as 
𝑆′0,𝑗 = (2 ∙ 𝑆0,𝑗) ⊕ (3 ∙ 𝑆1,𝑗) ⊕ 𝑆2,𝑗 ⊕ 𝑆3,𝑗 
𝑆′1,𝑗 = 𝑆0,𝑗 ⊕ (2 ∙ 𝑆1,𝑗) ⊕ (3 ∙ 𝑆2,𝑗) ⊕ 𝑆3,𝑗 
𝑆′2,𝑗 = 𝑆0,𝑗 ⊕ 𝑆1,𝑗 ⊕ (2 ∙ 𝑆2,𝑗) ⊕ (3 ∙ 𝑆3,𝑗) 
𝑆′3,𝑗 = (3 ∙ 𝑆0,𝑗) ⊕ 𝑆1,𝑗 ⊕ 𝑆2,𝑗 ⊕ (2 ∙ 𝑆3,𝑗) 
Table 4. Mix Columns 
 
Third, the 256 bytes of all blocks will be randomly shuffled using the Duffing map to 
generate the digital signature, which includes the first N bytes of the shuffling output. The 
shuffling process is reversible. When the drone receives the command message, it only executes 
the command after verifying the authenticity of the digital signature, proving that the 
communication has been held with the authenticated GCS. The drone will validate the digital 
signature by comparing it to its own generated signature from the command message. If this 
validation of the digital signature fails, the command is rejected immediately, and the Return-to-
Launch (RTL) mode is initiated and forces the drone to return to take-off position. 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this thesis, we develop a customized simulation framework to conduct our experiments 
in terms of code size, memory usage, energy consumption, computation time, and CPU cycle. 
We also revisit existing AES, DES, and 3DES (Stallings, 2006), and modify them to work in the 
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framework for performance comparison and analysis. The size of plaintext is changed between 








Figure 4. Performance of code size and memory usage against the size of plaintext. 
 
First, the performance of code size and memory usage is measured with the changes in 
the size of plaintext in Figure 4. Here, the code size is measured as the file size of the algorithm. 
As shown in Figure 4(a) and (b), the DroneSig has the smallest code size in terms of encryption 
and decryption algorithms compared to AES, DES, and 3DES. Because the DroneSig has a less 
number of operations for encryption and decryption processes, which make the file size of 
algorithms smaller. The AES has the largest code size in terms of encryption and decryption 
algorithms because it is the most complex algorithm which consists of four transformation 
functions: substitute bytes, shift rows, mix columns, and add round key. In Figure 4(c), we 
measure the memory usage of four schemes. It is clear that the DroneSig has the smallest 









Figure 5. Performance of energy consumption against the size of plaintext. 
 
Second, we measure the performance of energy consumption against the size of plaintext 
in Figure 5. As shown in Figure 5(a), the DroneSig achieves the lowest encryption energy 
consumption compared to AES, DES, and 3DES. DroneSig consumes less energy because it 
performs three lightweight operations: byte Substitution, matrix Transformation, and random 
Shuffling. Most importantly, three lightweight operations are only executed one time in the 
process of encryption. Thus, the lowest encryption energy consumption is observed by the 
DroneSig. However, for AES, DES, and 3DES, the same encryption operations are performed in 
multiple rounds. As a result, a large amount of energy is consumed. In Figure 5(b), it is clear that 
the decryption energy consumption of the DroneSig is lower than that of the other three schemes. 
Since the decryption is the reverse process of encryption, similar operations will be applied to 
ciphertext. Therefore, the lowest decryption energy consumption is obtained by the DroneSig. 
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The total energy consumption is measured in Figure 5(c), where the DroneSig provides the 
lowest total energy consumption compared to AES, DES, and 3DES. Because the DroneSig has 








Figure 6. Performance of computation time against the size of plaintext. 
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Third, the performance of computation time is measured with varying size of plaintext in 
Figure 6. The computation time is proportional to the complexity of the algorithm. As the 
algorithm becomes more complex, it requires a larger computation time. In the DroneSig, there 
are only three operations, and those operations are only executed one time for encryption and 
decryption. However, AES, DES, and 3DES are traditional cryptographic techniques, and several 
complex operations are executed in multiple rounds for encryption and decryption. Compared to 
DroneSig, AES, DES, and 3DES are much more complex. Therefore, the DroneSig can achieve 
the shortest computation time in terms of encryption and decryption, which are shown in Figure 
6(a) and (b), respectively. In Figure 6(c), the DroneSig outperforms AES, DES, and 3DES in 
terms of total computation time because the DroneSig can achieve the smallest encryption and 








Figure 7. Performance of CPU cycle against the size of plaintext. 
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Fourth, we measure the performance of the CPU cycle by changing the size of plaintext 
in Figure 7. As shown in Figure 7(a) and (b), the smallest number of CPU cycles is obtained by 
the DroneSig in terms of encryption and decryption. Since the DroneSig significantly reduces the 
number of operations in the process of encryption and decryption, a smaller number of CPU 
cycles is required to complete the operations of encryption and decryption. However, AES, DES, 
and 3DES are more complex than DroneSig. Thus, a larger number of CPU cycles is required to 
execute all operations. In Figure 7, the total number of encryption and decryption CPU cycles is 
measured for all schemes. The DroneSig provides the best performance compared to others 
because the DroneSig can achieve a smaller number of CPU cycles in terms of encryption and 
decryption. 
V. FUTURE WORK 
Although the analysis and simulation provided have proved that DroneSig is a 
lightweight, low-consumption, and fast calculation method, there are some improvements that 
can still be made. In Section IV, we compared code size, memory usage, energy consumption, 
computation time, and CPU cycle. Nevertheless, these seem to only show that the performance 
of DroneSig is good, but they cannot explain how safe it is. In this context, we will survey some 
of the provided results, which can be improved or extended further. 
Therefore, after a series of studies, we found two lightweight Micro Aerial Vehicle 
protocols to compare with DroneSig. The first one is Micro Air Vehicle Communication 
Protocol (MAVLink), a very lightweight, header-only message library for communication 
between drones and/or ground control stations (Meier, 2009). The second is UranusLink, 
Communication Protocol for UAV with Small Overhead and Encryption Ability (Kriz & 
Gabrlik, 2015).  
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We will deploy two attack methods at the same time to compare the security of each 
protocol. One type of attack can be an attempt to send random data in the encrypted portion and 
attempt to provide some combination of valid commands on the receiver after decryption, see if 
the length of the received data has changed. Another type of attack can be capturing the 
communication during flight and try to use the captured comment on the next flight to see if the 
drone executes. 
To determine the security of cryptographic protocols, we intend to use the ISO/IEC 
29128 method for evaluation testing. ISO/IEC 29128 is a newly proposed international standard 
that USES formal methods, which used for improving the security assurance of cryptographic 
protocols (Matsuo et al., 2010). Once the cryptographic protocol has passed ISO/IEC 29128 
certification, especially at its highest level of assurance, the protocol will be absolutely secure. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we proposed a lightweight digital signature protocol (DroneSig) to protect 
drones from a man-in-the-middle attack, where an adversary eavesdrops the communications 
between Ground Control Station and drone, and impersonates the Ground Control Station and 
sends fake commands to terminate the on-going mission or even take control over the drone. The 
basic idea of the DroneSig is that the drone will only execute the new command after validating 
the received digital signature from the Ground Control Station, proving that the new command 
message is coming from the authenticated Ground Control Station. If the validation of the digital 
signature fails, the new command is rejected immediately, and the Return-to-Launch (RTL) 
mode is initiated and forces the drone to return to the take-off position. In order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed approach, we developed a customized simulation framework and 
compared it with prior approaches. The simulation results show that the proposed DroneSig is a 
24 
viable and competitive approach defending drones against a man-in-the-middle attack.  
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APPENDIX B: SIMULATION SOFTWARE SOURCE CODE 
Sbox = ( 
0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 
0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, 
0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 
0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, 
0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 
0xD8, 0x31, 0x15, 
0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xEB, 
0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, 
0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 
0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, 
0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 
0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF, 
0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, 0x50, 
0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, 
0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 
0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, 
0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 
0x5D, 0x19, 0x73, 
0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, 0xDE, 
0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, 
0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 
0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, 
0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 
0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08, 
0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, 0x4B, 
0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, 
0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 
0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, 
0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 
0x55, 0x28, 0xDF, 
0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, 0xB0, 
0x54, 0xBB, 0x16, 
) 
 
InvSbox = ( 
0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, 0x81, 
0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, 
0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 
0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, 
0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 
0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E, 
0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, 0x6D, 
0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, 
31 
0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 
0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, 
0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 
0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84, 
0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xB8, 
0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, 
0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 
0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, 
0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 
0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73, 
0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x1C, 
0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, 
0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 
0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, 
0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 
0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4, 
0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 
0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, 
0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 
0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, 
0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 
0x53, 0x99, 0x61, 
0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 
0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D, 
) 
 
xtime = lambda a: (((a << 1) ^ 0x1B) & 0xFF) if (a & 0x80) else (a << 1) 
 
def text2matrix(text): 
    matrix = [] 
    for i in range(16): 
        byte = (text >> (8 * (15 - i))) & 0xFF 
        if i % 4 == 0: 
            matrix.append([byte]) 
        else: 
            matrix[i // 4].append(byte) 




    text = 0 
    for i in range(4):  # 0~4 
        for j in range(4): 
            text |= (matrix[i][j] << (120 - 8 * (4 * i + j)))  





    for i in range(4): 
        for j in range(4): 




    for i in range(4): 
        for j in range(4): 




    s[0][1], s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1] = s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1], s[0][1] 
    s[0][2], s[1][2], s[2][2], s[3][2] = s[2][2], s[3][2], s[0][2], s[1][2] 




    s[0][1], s[1][1], s[2][1], s[3][1] = s[3][1], s[0][1], s[1][1], s[2][1] 
    s[0][2], s[1][2], s[2][2], s[3][2] = s[2][2], s[3][2], s[0][2], s[1][2] 




    # please see Sec 4.1.2 in The Design of Rijndael 
    t = a[0] ^ a[1] ^ a[2] ^ a[3] 
    u = a[0] 
    a[0] ^= t ^ xtime(a[0] ^ a[1]) 
    a[1] ^= t ^ xtime(a[1] ^ a[2]) 
    a[2] ^= t ^ xtime(a[2] ^ a[3]) 




    for i in range(4): 




    # see Sec 4.1.3 in The Design of Rijndael 
    for i in range(4): 
        u = xtime(xtime(s[i][0] ^ s[i][2])) 
        v = xtime(xtime(s[i][1] ^ s[i][3])) 
        s[i][0] ^= u 
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        s[i][1] ^= v 
        s[i][2] ^= u 
        s[i][3] ^= v 
 
    __mix_columns(s) 
  
def encrypt(plaintext): 
    plain_state = text2matrix(plaintext) 
 
    __sub_bytes(plain_state) 
    __shift_rows(plain_state) 
    __mix_columns(plain_state) 
 
    return matrix2text(plain_state) 
 
def decrypt(ciphertext): 
    cipher_state = text2matrix(ciphertext) 
 
    __inv_mix_columns(cipher_state) 
    __inv_shift_rows(cipher_state) 
    __inv_sub_bytes(cipher_state) 
 
    return matrix2text(cipher_state) 
  
def chaos(x, y): 
    line = encrypt(plaintext) 
 
    sep = [int(digit) for digit in str(line)] 
    k = len(sep) 
 
    dot = []  # seed 
    value = [] 
    x1 = [] 
    y1 = [] 
    x1.append(x) 
    y1.append(y) 
    dot.append(x * 2 + y * 2.5) 
    for i in range(k): 
        if i > 0: 
            x1.append(y1[i - 1]) 
            y1.append(-0.2 * x1[i - 1] + 2.75 * y1[i - 1] - math.pow(y1[i - 1], 3)) 
            dot.append(x1[i] * 2 + y1[i] * 2.5) 
 
    for j in range(k): 
        random.seed(dot[j]) 
        num = random.randint(0, k) 
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        value.append(sep[num]) 
 
    new_sep = ''.join('%s' % id for id in value) 
    return new_sep 
 
 
def inv_chaos(text, x, y): 
    sep = [int(digit) for digit in str(text)] 
    k = len(sep) 
 
    dot = []  # seed 
    value = [] 
    x1 = [] 
    y1 = [] 
    x1.append(x) 
    y1.append(y) 
    dot.append(x * 2 + y * 2.5) 
 
    for i in range(k): 
        if i > 0: 
            x1.append(y1[i - 1]) 
            y1.append(-0.2 * x1[i - 1] + 2.75 * y1[i - 1] - math.pow(y1[i - 1], 3)) 
            dot.append(x1[i] * 2 + y1[i] * 2.5) 
 
    for j in range(k): 
        random.seed(dot[j]) 
        num = random.randint(0, k) 
        re = sep[j] 
        value.insert(num, re) 
 
    new_sep = ''.join('%s' % id for id in value) 
    return new_sep 
